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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REMEDIES, AND NELSON V. COLORADO 
Michael L. Wells* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nelson v. Colorado1 
opinion, in which the Court addressed the novel issue of constitutional 
remedies for persons wrongly convicted of crimes.  Governments routinely 
deprive criminal defendants of both liberty and property and do so before 
giving them a chance to appeal their convictions and sentences.2  In addition 
to imprisoning convicted individuals, the state often imposes charges on 
them, in the form of court fees, probation supervision fees, fines, and 
restitution.3  When a conviction is overturned, the state typically refunds 
these monetary exactions but seldom compensates for the loss of liberty.4 
In Nelson, the Supreme Court addressed an unusual case in which the state 
did not return the money.5  The Colorado Supreme Court held that a Colorado 
statute called the Exoneration Act6 provided the sole avenue for obtaining a 
refund.7  Under that statute: 
 
*  Professor of Law and Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law, 
University of Georgia School of Law.  The author wishes to thank Dan Coenen, Jonathan 
Nash, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments on a draft.  This Article was prepared for the 
Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil 
Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on 
October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law.   
 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017). 
 2. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1(a)(1) (2017) (“[E]xcept in cases in which life 
imprisonment, life without parole or the death penalty may be imposed, . . . the judge . . . shall 
prescribe a determinate sentence”); id. § 17-10-9 (instructing on the procedure for calculating 
a sentence where the defendant “has been incarcerated pending the prosecution of an appeal 
to any court”); id. § 17-11-1 (“If convicted, judgment may be entered against the defendant 
for all costs accruing in the committing and trial courts and by any officer pending the 
prosecution.”). 
 3. See generally Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, 
NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-
punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/MTK2-DDQX] (describing the trend of increasing fees 
associated with a criminal prosecution).  
 4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1262 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4103(a) 
(2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-73 (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(4) (McKinney 2018); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.008(A) (West 2017); see also David G. Post, Nelson v. 
Colorado:  New Life for an Old Idea?, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207–09. 
 5. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252.   
 6. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-65-101, 13-65-102, 13-65-103 (2017), invalidated by Nelson 
v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).  
 7. People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1071 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249.  
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a person who has been convicted of a felony . . . and sentenced to a term of 
incarceration as a result of that conviction and has served all or part of such 
sentence . . . may be eligible for compensation . . . upon a finding that the 
person was actually innocent of the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.8 
The statute went on to state that, in the event the claim is contested by the 
state, “the burden shall be on the petitioner to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that he or she is actually innocent of all crimes that are the subject 
of the petition, and that he or she is eligible to receive compensation pursuant 
to this article.”9  With only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court held that 
Colorado’s Exoneration Act offended the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
deprived the plaintiff Shannon Nelson, who had obtained reversal of her 
conviction on appeal, of property without due process of law.10 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court focuses largely on how to apply 
the procedural due process test established in the case of Mathews v. 
Eldridge,11 under which determining the process that is due depends on a 
balancing of interests.12  Applying Mathews, the Nelson Court held that the 
state of “Colorado’s scheme fails due process measurement because 
defendants’ interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration Act is unacceptable, and 
the State has shown no countervailing interests in retaining the amounts in 
question.”13  Notably, and in keeping with the general practice of the states, 
the Court also appeared to recognize a basic distinction between 
compensating defendants for loss of property and for loss of liberty.14 
The end result in Nelson will satisfy nearly everyone’s sense of basic 
justice, at least insofar as the monetary refund is concerned.  Still, the case is 
interesting not for its outcome but because the Court’s analysis touches on, 
but fails to fully engage with, subtle and difficult questions of constitutional 
law. 
This Article examines three important aspects of the case—outside of the 
procedural due process balancing question—that receive little, if any, 
attention in the Court’s opinion.  Part I shows that the Court’s procedural due 
process analysis skips over the logical first step and doctrinally harder 
question of whether Nelson had a constitutionally protected property interest 
once Colorado took the money pursuant to her conviction.  On this point, 
Justice Ginsburg seems to set aside the Court’s previously settled doctrine 
about the nature and source of property protected by the Due Process 
Clause.15  Instead, the Court opts for an ad hoc definition of property, perhaps 
 
 8. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102(1)(a).  
 9. Id. § 102(6)(b). 
 10. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257–58.  
 11. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 12. Id. at 348.  
 13. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257–58. 
 14. Id. at 1257.  
 15. Id. at 1257–58.  
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because application of the settled doctrine may have allowed Colorado to 
keep the money, a result which seven Justices very much wanted to avoid.16 
Part II argues that the Court could have and should have taken a different 
analytical pathway toward the outcome it reached.  In particular, Part II 
describes a rationale for reversal that would have resulted in return of the 
money without sowing confusion in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.  This 
analysis hinges on the rules governing Supreme Court review of state court 
judgments.  Ordinarily, the Court will not examine the state law grounds for 
a state court’s decision in such cases.17  An exception to this rule exists, 
however, for cases in which the relied-upon state law undermines federal 
rights and lacks fair support in prior state law.18  The Supreme Court could 
readily have found that the Colorado court’s interpretation of the Exoneration 
Act met the requirements of this exception, thus allowing the Court to reverse 
the lower court’s judgment without relying upon a new and controversial 
notion of the meaning of property. 
Part III turns to the Court’s distinction between deprivations of property 
and liberty.  Nelson holds that “[t]o comport with due process, a State may 
not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of 
exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated.”19  Some 
of Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning strongly suggests that there is no due process 
right to obtain redress for the lost liberty.20  Yet the Fourteenth Amendment 
seems to draw no such distinction between liberty and property.21  It 
guarantees “due process” when the state deprives a person of “life, liberty, or 
property.”22  Part III asks whether there are grounds upon which a backward-
looking money-damages remedy can be justified for the deprivation of 
property alone, or whether the liberty/property distinction is simply an 
arbitrary one. 
I.  PROPERTY AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Shannon Nelson was convicted of physically and sexually abusing her 
children.23  She paid restitution and court costs and served prison time while 
her appeal was pending.24  After obtaining reversal of her conviction, she 
won an acquittal on retrial.25  But when Nelson sought restoration of the 
money she had paid the state during her trial and incarceration, Colorado 
officials refused her request.26  The state maintained, and the Colorado 
Supreme Court agreed,27 that the Exoneration Act provided the sole means 
 
 16. See discussion infra Part I.B.   
 17. See infra Part II.  
 18. See infra Part II.   
 19. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 1257.   
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.   
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. See People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1079 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249. 
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to obtain a refund.28  Nelson and Louis Madden—the defendant in a 
companion case decided in the same opinion—were not entitled to 
restoration, as they had not attempted to meet the requirements of the 
Colorado statute.29 
With only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court held that Colorado had to 
refund the money notwithstanding Nelson’s failure to comply with the 
Exoneration Act.30  Justice Ginsburg set forth both the issue and the holding 
at the beginning of the opinion and stated, “When a criminal conviction is 
invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged 
to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, 
and as a consequence of, the conviction? Our answer is yes.”31  Justice 
Ginsburg dismissed the Exoneration Act as a constitutionally insufficient 
remedy.32  As she put the key point, by limiting relief to persons convicted 
of felonies, and by requiring a defendant to “prove her innocence by clear 
and convincing evidence to obtain the refund,” the scheme could “not 
comport with due process.”33 
The problem with the Nelson Court’s reasoning is that it equates 
Fourteenth Amendment property with common law property.  The difficulty 
with this interpretive move is that it overlooks well-settled Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine.34  When the issue is procedural due process, as the 
Court said it was in Nelson, the Court usually declines to equate Fourteenth 
Amendment and common law notions of property.35  And this difference, had 
it been recognized, might well have dictated a different result in Nelson. 
This Part first addresses the difference between common law property and 
property as conceived by Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  It then goes 
on to discuss the Nelson decision in light of this jurisprudence. 
A. The Pre-Nelson Distinction Between Common Law 
and Fourteenth Amendment Property 
Justice Ginsburg seemingly took it as self-evident that the money at issue 
in Nelson was property for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.36  Indeed, the 
only point in the opinion where she touched on the issue at all was in applying 
the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, a test which typically does not 
come into play at all unless the Court first finds that a deprivation of property 
(or life or liberty) has occurred.37  The Mathews test requires balancing “[t]he 
 
 28. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.  
 29. Id. at 1257.   
 30. Id. at 1257–58.  
 31. Id. at 1252. 
 32. Id. at 1255.  
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Part I.A. 
 35. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005) (stating that 
the determination of whether a Fourteenth Amendment property interest exists, “despite its 
state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of federal constitutional law”).  
 36. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257.  
 37. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756 (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause 
does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit.’”). 
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private interest affected[,] . . . the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest 
through the procedures used[,] and . . . the governmental interest at stake.”38 
In analyzing the first element of the Mathews test, the Nelson Court 
observed that persons such as Nelson “have an obvious interest in regaining 
the money they paid to Colorado.”39  Under the Court’s precedents, however, 
it is not at all “obvious” that the state deprived Nelson of her “property” in a 
constitutionally relevant sense.  The Court has not ordinarily defined 
“property” by reference to ordinary language and conventional 
understandings and instead finds that the word may be broader or narrower 
than its use in everyday language depending on the context under which the 
property issue arises.40 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth41 is the Supreme Court’s 
leading case on the nature and content of “property” as used in the Due 
Process Clause.  The plaintiff in Roth was a teacher on a one-year contract at 
a public college who claimed that he was entitled to due process in connection 
with nonrenewal.42  The general issue raised by the case was whether, and 
under what circumstances, a variety of government benefits would qualify as 
property entitled to due process protection.43  Building on recent theorizing 
on what was becoming known as “new property” claims,44 the Court declared 
that “the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well 
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”45  In particular: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person . . . must . . . have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.  It is a purpose of the ancient institution 
of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily 
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined . . . .  Property 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are created 
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law.46 
Under this framework, the test for whether a person holds a property 
interest in a benefit is whether the person has a “legitimate claim of 
entitlement” under state or federal statutory or common law to getting or 
 
 38. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255. 
 39. Id.  Although the Court does not address the issue of whether state sovereign immunity 
blocks a judicial order instructing it to refund the money, the holding clearly, if implicitly, 
rejects the defense.  Space constraints preclude a thorough analysis of this issue.  One possible 
basis for rejection of sovereign immunity in this context is that the state has waived immunity 
by initiating criminal prosecution and exacting the money in the course of the prosecution. See 
generally Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that 
that a state may wave its sovereign immunity by its conduct in litigation).  
 40. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 885 (2000). 
 41. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 42. Id. at 566–67.  
 43. Id.; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 52 CORNELL L. 
REV. 405, 436–37 (1977). 
 44. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 918. 
 45. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72. 
 46. Id. at 577. 
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keeping that benefit.47  For example, it is settled that an employee who may 
only be fired “for cause” holds a property interest in the job.48  By contrast, 
the plaintiff in Roth was a college teacher on a one-year contract.49  He thus 
had no property interest in his job because he had no “legitimate” expectation 
of keeping it under applicable state law rules.50  Accordingly, he was not 
entitled to a due process hearing in connection with his nonrenewal.51 
The Exoneration Act aside, there were grounds for finding that Nelson had 
a state-created property interest in restoration of the money she paid.  Citing 
Toland v. Strohl,52 Nelson’s brief to the Court asserted that, before the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s construction of the Exoneration Act, the general 
practice was to refund money upon reversal of a conviction.53  The state’s 
brief acknowledged the practice but disputed its generality.54  As an example, 
the state pointed to the case of People v. Noel,55 where the Colorado Court 
of Appeals held that money paid for probation supervision services would 
not be refunded.56  The state also identified cases beyond Noel in which 
refund claims were rejected, though most of these authorities were dated and 
came from other jurisdictions.57  In any event, the identified exceptions to 
refund availability would not undermine Nelson’s “property” claim.  The key 
issue was whether the exceptions were wide ranging enough to justify a 
finding that restoration is simply a matter within the discretion of state 
officers and thus not a property right at all. 
Relevant considerations in determining the content of state-created 
property include not only the formal law but also widespread practices.  In 
Perry v. Sindermann,58 decided the same day as Roth, another college teacher 
named Sindermann, also on a one-year contract and summarily denied a 
renewal, had more success than Roth.59  In Roth’s case, “the terms of [his] 
appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next 
year.”60  Nor was there any “state statute or University rule or policy that 
secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to 
it.”61  By contrast, Sindermann had alleged that he could show that “the 
college had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under that 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997). 
 49. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67.  
 50. Id. at 578–79.  
 51. Id.  
 52. 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961). 
 53. Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (No. 15-1256). 
 54. Brief for Respondent at 15, Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (No. 15-1256). 
 55. 134 P.3d 484 (Colo. App. 2005). 
 56. Id. at 485–86.  
 57. Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 18–22. 
 58. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 594–95.  
 60. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). 
 61. Id.  
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program.”62  The general principle underlying the Sindermann holding is that 
property can be created by “the existence of rules and understandings.”63 
In the decades after Roth and Sindermann, courts have recognized state-
created property interests in a variety of government benefits and jobs.64  
Still, it is clear that Fourteenth Amendment property does not include benefits 
that are only available at the discretion of government authorities.65  That 
principle proved decisive in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,66 where a 
woman sought police intervention after her former husband came to her home 
in violation of a protective order she had obtained against him.67  Ultimately, 
after her pleas were ignored, her former husband kidnapped and murdered 
her children.68  Despite the language in the order that seemed to mandate 
police intervention, the Court rejected the property claim, noting that “[a] 
well established tradition of police discretion has long co-existed with 
apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”69 
The application of these principles to Nelson’s case is unclear.  The state-
created property approach was not litigated in Nelson.70  In fact, it was not 
even mentioned by the Supreme Court.71  The general practice throughout 
the nation for a long time and in Colorado before this case, or at least before 
Colorado’s enactment of the Exoneration Act in 2013, lent support to the 
notion that a property interest generated by state law did exist.72  In the 
Nelson opinion, Justice Ginsburg herself noted that “[p]rior to the 
Exoneration Act, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the competence of 
courts, upon reversal of a conviction, to order the refund of monetary 
exactions imposed on a defendant solely by reason of the conviction.”73  But 
none of this seems to matter—or at least to matter much—in applying the 
principles of Roth and Sindermann.  Instead, for the Nelson Court, the 
decisive issue concerned the impact of the Exoneration Act, since it set forth 
controlling state law at the time the alleged deprivation of Nelson’s property 
occurred.74 
Put simply, federal law does not oblige states to recognize any particular 
set of property interests, at least for the protection provided by procedural 
 
 62. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 600.  
 63. Id. at 602. 
 64. See, e.g., SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 111–12 (4th ed. 2015) 
(collecting cases). 
 65. See infra notes 66–69.  
 66. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 751–54.   
 68. Id. at 754.  
 69. Id. at 760.  
 70. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53; Brief for Respondent, supra note 
54. 
 71. See generally Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).  
 72. See id. at 1254 n.5 (citing Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961)); see also N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 60.35(4) (McKinney 2018) (“Any person who has paid a mandatory surcharge, 
sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, a crime victim assistance fee or a 
supplemental sex offender victim fee under the authority of this section based upon a 
conviction that is subsequently reversed . . . shall be entitled to a refund.”).  
 73. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1254 n.5 (2017) (citing Strohl, 364 P.2d at 588). 
 74. Id. at 1255.  
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due process.75  A state may both opt against creating a property right in a 
particular benefit and decline to continue to create property in a given 
benefit.76  Although a state cannot eliminate property rights that already exist, 
it may, for example, stop issuing new employment contracts that create an 
expectation of continued employment or decline to renew a business license 
when its term expires.77  Under this principle, the Exoneration Act seemed to 
present an insurmountable hurdle for Nelson and Madden.  By its terms, it 
limited recovery to persons convicted of felonies and required the applicant 
to prove innocence by clear and convincing evidence.78  These provisions 
seem to eliminate any legitimate expectation of recovery for costs related to 
misdemeanor convictions and for criminal defendants who obtain reversal 
but cannot meet the clear and convincing test.  And, due to the timing of the 
relevant proceedings, Nelson had no basis for reliance on the previously 
available refund practice.  As construed by the Colorado Supreme Court, the 
Exoneration Act provided the sole means available to obtain compensation 
for wrongful convictions.79  It thus seems entirely sensible to say that any 
property interest that Nelson had was hemmed in by the requirements of the 
Act, a process with which she had not even attempted to comply. 
B.  Property Under Nelson 
In Nelson, both the Colorado Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
ignored the Roth framework.80  Justice Ginsburg’s approach may simply 
echo the history of the Nelson litigation in the Colorado courts, although a 
remand on the property issue would seem to have been the more appropriate 
response.  An alternative explanation for bypassing Roth is that the majority 
recognized that under the Roth test, the Exoneration Act would oblige a 
finding of no property and no refund—a result it wished to avoid.  On this 
view, seven Justices were determined to see to it that Nelson and Madden 
received refunds despite the Exoneration Act.  With that goal in mind, the 
Court came up with an ad hoc approach to the property question, a move 
reminiscent of other instances in which the Court has issued “inconsistent 
pronouncements” as to “the meaning of property under federal law.”81 
The Court in Nelson did not acknowledge its departure from Roth.82  It 
also did not suggest in any way that it was intentionally endorsing an 
alternative to the Roth test.83  As a result, one has to sift through the language 
 
 75. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 920–22 (describing the Court’s “positivist” approach).  
 76. See, e.g., Price v. Bd. of Educ., 755 F.3d 605, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 77. See, e.g., id.; see also Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(business licenses). 
 78. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102 (2017).  
 79. See People v. Madden, 364 P.3d 866, 870 (Colo. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Nelson v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017); People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 
137 S. Ct. 1249. 
 80. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1254 n.5.  See generally Madden, 364 P.3d 866; Nelson, 362 
P.3d 1070.  
 81. Merrill, supra note 40, at 889. 
 82. See generally Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249.  
 83. Id.  
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of the opinion to find clues as to what, in substance, the Court was doing.  
Bits and pieces of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion suggest that the property 
interest she had in mind reflected a common sense, intuitive notion of 
“property.”84  On this view, everyone knows that the money in a person’s 
pocket or bank account, if legally obtained, is that person’s property.  Thus, 
the starting point was Nelson’s uncontested ownership of the money before 
her conviction.  In other words, the case concerned “the continuing 
deprivation of property after a conviction has been reversed.”85  Nelson thus 
sought “to get [her] money back”86 because she had an “interest in regaining 
[her] funds.”87  In turn, with the conviction overturned, “the State . . . has 
zero claim of right”88 to the funds.  In short, when Colorado took the money 
pursuant to Nelson’s conviction, the state obtained only a defeasible interest 
in it.  Once the conviction had been overturned, Colorado’s basis for taking 
the money had disappeared, leaving Nelson as the only other stakeholder. 
The presumption of innocence bolstered the reasoning.  Between the 
moment of her conviction and its eventual reversal, Nelson retained the 
presumption of innocence, itself a constitutional limit on the state’s power.89  
Nelson and Madden, according to Justice Ginsburg, ended up in the same 
position as someone who was never convicted at all because “once [the] 
convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored.”90  
The state of Colorado asserted that the now-invalid conviction allowed the 
state to keep the money.91  But the State of “Colorado may not presume a 
person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary 
exactions.”92 
This line of reasoning tracked what Professor Thomas Merrill has called a 
“natural-property strategy,” under which “the Constitution is a compact 
designed to protect certain rights of property that self-evidently belong to all 
persons.”93  Though some might say that those convicted of criminal charges 
are different from other persons, the presumption of innocence cuts sharply 
against the notion that Nelson, once her conviction was reversed, was 
differently situated from anyone else.  Thus, there was a taking of her 
property because concluding otherwise would not be “natural.”  Notably, this 
approach veered sharply away from Roth by diminishing—in a sweeping 
way—the role of state statutes in defining Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 84. Id. at 1255–57. 
 85. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id.  
 89. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see also, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 
(1970) (striking down a New York Family Court finding of guilt against a juvenile defendant 
where the state court’s procedure failed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every 
element of a crime).   
 90. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1256. 
 93. Merrill, supra note 40, at 943.  Merrill introduces the idea for the purpose of a 
thorough analysis of alternatives, not as a description of the Court’s doctrine or as a 
recommendation. Id. at 942–44.  
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property.94  In effect, according to Justice Ginsburg, Colorado’s Exoneration 
Act was irrelevant as to the existence and scope of any property interest.95  
That statute is merely the state’s procedure for obtaining relief, not a 
mechanism redefining property.96  And, as such, the procedure failed to meet 
the test of the Due Process Clause.97 
As Professor Merrill notes, a natural-property model ignores the Court’s 
own doctrine on the content of property for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.98  In addition, “[I]t is far from clear that it would be coherent 
or desirable to speak of a set of core property rights protected directly by the 
Constitution itself.  The basic problem is that property seems always to entail 
a large component of positive regulation.”99  As for the property right 
recognized in Nelson, the practical significance of these objections depends 
on future developments. 
The lack of a sharp split among the Justices—as well as the absence of any 
overt questioning of Roth—suggests that Nelson’s conception of property 
was offered as a case-specific alternative to Roth’s state-law-based 
approach.100  The generally conservative composition of the current Court 
makes it unlikely that the Roth doctrine will be threatened any time soon by 
Nelson.  The likely explanation for Justice Ginsburg’s approach in Nelson is 
that the Court defined “property” on an ad hoc basis for the sake of getting 
the desired result in that one case.  The problems raised by a general “natural 
rights” approach do not arise so long as the Nelson doctrine can be cabined 
by tying it to the narrow circumstances of invalidated criminal convictions. 
But the ruling will probably disrupt current practice even if the Court 
manages to confine Nelson’s conception of property to that context.  Even in 
the invalidated-conviction context, there may be good reasons to deny a 
refund in some circumstances, but those reasons may not be good enough to 
overcome a doctrine based on the Due Process Clause.  For example, in 
 
 94. See supra Part I.A. 
 95. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255 (“Because no further criminal process is implicated, 
Mathews ‘provides the relevant inquiry.’”).   
 96. See id.  
 97. Aside from the natural rights element, this reasoning echoes that of Cleveland Board 
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).  Loudermill established that “[t]he 
categories of substance and procedure are distinct” and that “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined 
by the procedures provided for its deprivation.” Id. at 541.  Perhaps the Court’s opinion in 
Nelson is meant to be an application of the Loudermill principle.  Under this view, the 
Exoneration Act is merely a procedure for obtaining restoration rather than a substantive limit 
on the property rights of persons convicted after its enactment.  One problem with this view 
of Nelson, however, is that the Court’s opinion does not develop its thesis.  Another is that the 
Exoneration Act’s terms both expand recovery (to include compensation for time spent in 
prison) and puts limits on recovery (to persons who are convicted of felonies, sentenced to 
imprisonment, and have served part of the sentence of imprisonment). See COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-65-103 (2017).  These features, along with the imposition of a “clear and convincing 
proof of innocence” burden on the claimant, seem better characterized as the articulation of a 
substantive right rather than as a procedure for the accurate resolution of traditional 
restoration-after-reversal cases like Nelson’s. 
 98. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 943–44. 
 99. Id. at 944. 
 100. See supra Part I.A. 
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People v. Noel,101 a conviction was vacated after the defendant had paid a 
$630 probation-supervision fee.102  The Colorado Court of Appeals declined 
to order a refund, mainly “because the purpose of probation is primarily 
rehabilitative, and because defendant could have benefited from the 
supervisory services she received and paid for.”103  For many of us, that 
reasoning makes sense.  Yet Nelson’s due process rationale may not allow 
for such a distinction because the constitutional presumption of innocence 
applied to Noel no less than it applied to Nelson.  For Nelson and Madden, 
“once [their] convictions were erased, the presumption of innocence was 
restored.”104  At that point, “Colorado has no interest in withholding from 
Nelson and Madden money to which the State currently has zero claim of 
right.”105 
In coming years, courts will face potentially thorny issues as to the scope 
of Nelson:  Does it apply to a case like Noel?  Perhaps not, because the state 
has contributed something of value to Noel.  Would it apply to a case in which 
an admittedly guilty defendant obtains release on account of admission of 
evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule?  Are there 
any limits on its application?106 
II.  SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND THE “ADEQUATE 
AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND” DOCTRINE 
Justice Ginsburg’s ad hoc treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment raises 
a question:  Could the Court have offered an alternative, and more 
convincing, justification for the outcome? As it turns out, the Court had a 
doctrinal route to providing a refund to Nelson without ignoring its settled 
rules on the content of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause.  This 
analytical pathway involves navigating some esoteric features of Supreme 
Court doctrine on the proper scope of its review of state court judgments.  
Under a core principle of this field of law, referred to as the “adequate and 
independent state ground” doctrine, the Court routinely refuses to examine 
state law grounds for a state court’s decision.107 
The adequate and independent state ground doctrine may have influenced 
the petitioners’ litigating strategy in Nelson.  The Court took the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s state law ruling as a given, and thus did not challenge the 
 
 101. 134 P.3d 484 (Colo. App. 2005).  
 102. Id. at 485.  
 103. Id. at 487; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 20–22 (discussing a variety 
of equitable considerations courts from a variety of jurisdictions have advanced in declining 
refunds). 
 104. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017). 
 105. Id. at 1257. 
 106. The Nelson Court does seem to leave the issue open, if only by rejecting the notion 
that there were any equitable considerations on Colorado’s side of these particular cases.  See 
id. 
 107. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989) (“This Court long has held that it will 
not consider an issue of federal law on direct review from a judgment of a state court if that 
judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal 
claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.”). 
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Colorado court’s interpretation of the Exoneration Act.108  But there is an 
exception to the general rule of nonreview of state law grounds of decision, 
and this exception would have provided a viable rationale for reversing the 
Colorado Supreme Court.109  Although this issue was not briefed or argued 
by the parties, it could be that the Colorado court misread the Exoneration 
Act by treating it as providing the sole basis for recovery of money by persons 
such as Nelson.110  On this better view, the Act was not meant to operate in 
this way and would have instead provided a property right to restoration of 
Nelson’s payments under a straightforward application of the traditional Roth 
test. 
This Part begins with a discussion of the development of the adequate and 
independent state ground doctrine and the Supreme Court decisions that have 
helped to shape its application and exceptions. It then discusses how this 
understanding of the doctrine could have applied in the Nelson case to better 
align the decision with the Supreme Court’s prior property jurisprudence 
without disturbing the outcome for the plaintiff. 
A.  The Adequate and Independent State Ground Doctrine 
From the perspective of Supreme Court review of state court judgments, a 
key feature in Nelson was that the Colorado court ruled that the state’s 
Exoneration Act provided the sole means by which Nelson and Madden 
could make a claim to recover any money.111  Many cases that come to the 
Supreme Court from state courts include both state and federal issues.112  But 
the Court does not ordinarily review the state law issues.113  The Judiciary 
Act of 1789 explicitly limited Supreme Court review to federal issues.114  
Although an 1867 amendment to the Act omitted that limit,115 the Court in 
Murdock v. City of Memphis116 declared that it would continue to follow this 
practice.117  Murdock ruled that “[t]he State courts are the appropriate 
tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law, 
 
 108. See generally Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249.  
 109. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of 
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1924 (2003) (discussing the 
“deeply embedded understanding that state-court determinations of state law in federal cases 
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Wechsler’s language, the ‘existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on 
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Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of 
Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977))).  
 110. See People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249.  
 111. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1254.  
 112. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 488–89 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the “interstitial nature of federal 
law”).  
 113. See generally Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).  
 114. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.  
 115. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 
(2012)). 
 116. 87 U.S. 590 (1875). 
 117. Id. at 638.  
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whether statutory or otherwise.”118  Six decades after Murdock, the policy 
behind this holding was bolstered by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,119 
which held that the source of authority for state law is the state’s own 
lawmaking institutions—its legislature and its courts.120  In the ordinary case, 
Supreme Court review of state law is thus incompatible with the Erie 
principle.  If Nelson were an ordinary case, the Court would take the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s reading of the Exoneration Act as authoritative. 
But Nelson was not an ordinary case because—when thoughtfully 
considered—it brings into play an exception to the general Murdock rule.  
The exception covers situations in which the state creates a right, and that 
right then receives protection from federal law.121  In this type of case, the 
state court’s ruling on the “antecedent” state ground holds the potential of, in 
effect, denying the protection of a federal right to which the state right is 
connected.  In other words, “where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent 
for determining whether a federal right has been violated, some review of the 
basis for the state court’s determination of the state-law question is essential 
if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.”122 
A classic illustration of the doctrine is Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. 
Brand.123  There, a public school teacher was fired despite a provision in state 
law that, according to her reading, granted her a contract right against 
termination at will.124  She sued on the theory that her dismissal violated the 
Contract Clause of Article I of the Constitution, which forbids states from 
impairing contractual obligations.125  The Indiana Supreme Court held that 
under the state’s Teacher Tenure Act, because her contract was for only one 
year at a time, she was not shielded from dismissal without cause.126  The 
case falls into the “antecedent state ground” category because the putative 
state right to continued employment was antecedent to the teacher’s 
Contracts Clause claim.127  The Supreme Court explained: 
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful 
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court but, 
in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we 
are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its 
terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, 
impaired its obligation.128 
Other cases describe the standard of review as asking whether the state 
court’s ruling has “fair support” in state law.129  In Anderson, the Court 
 
 118. Id. at 626. 
 119. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 120. Id. at 80.  
 121. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 112, at 487–88. 
 122. Id. at 488. 
 123. 303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
 124. Id. at 97.   
 125. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.   
 126. Anderson, 303 U.S. at 99–100.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. See Monaghan, supra note 43, at 1924–25.  
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examined the state law background and found that the statute that established 
the teacher’s employment terms supported her position that the employment 
relationship was contractual.130  A key reason was that “[u]ntil its decision in 
the present case, the Supreme Court of Indiana had uniformly held that the 
teacher’s right to continued employment by virtue of the indefinite contract 
created pursuant to the act was contractual.”131  Having found insufficient 
support for the Indiana court’s ruling against the teacher on the state law 
contract issue, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Contracts Clause 
applied.132 
B.  Nelson as an Exception 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of state-created property rights falls 
into the “antecedent state ground” category.  As with the Contract Clause 
issue in Anderson, state rights are antecedent to federal protection because 
the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause could be improperly 
nullified by a state court’s ruling on the content of state-created property.133 
When the Supreme Court considers a state-created property issue on review 
from a state court decision, its role as the ultimate arbiter of federal law 
justifies some examination of the state grounds to be sure that they meet the 
“fair support” test.134  As a functional matter, a determination of whether one 
has a state-law-based “property” interest for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause is no different from a determination of whether one has a state-law-
based “contract” for purposes of the Contract Clause.135 
The issue in Nelson could have been framed in these terms.  The Colorado 
court had found that the Exoneration Act provided the sole means for Nelson 
and Madden to recover the money they had paid.136  That construction of the 
statute provided the state law ground for the rejection of their claim to a 
property interest in restoration under pre-Exoneration Act practice.  As in 
Anderson, the issue that brought Nelson to the Supreme Court was whether 
that state law ruling had fair support in state law.137  On this issue, the state 
court’s reasoning is key.  Yet the Colorado court’s treatment of the impact of 
the Exoneration Act consists of two sentences: 
[A] court may not intrude on the General Assembly’s power by authorizing 
a refund from public funds without statutory authority to do so.  The 
Exoneration Act provides the sole statutory authority for the court to issue 
a refund to criminal defendants after their convictions are overturned.138 
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Beyond these two sentences, the Colorado court did not discuss the terms of 
the statute, its legislative history, or the context under which it was 
enacted.139 
To be sure, Nelson did not litigate the issue of whether this state law ruling 
found adequate support in state law.140  Curiously, however, her Supreme 
Court brief pointed to a promising argument that such “fair support” did not 
exist.141  The brief described the state law background of restoration in 
Colorado and elsewhere, including the Exoneration Act.142  The brief noted 
the widely recognized rule that “[a] party who has paid money pursuant to a 
judgment has always been entitled to a refund when the judgment is 
reversed.”143  It added—without any dispute from the state144—that “[u]ntil 
this case, Colorado followed the traditional rule.”145  Then, in a critical 
passage, the brief showed that the Exoneration Act was not conceived or 
enacted with the aim of overturning settled practice.146 
Instead, Nelson argued that the Act’s “immediate impetus” was to deal 
with the case of a man who served eighteen years for a murder he did not 
commit before being exonerated by DNA evidence.147  The statute was 
“supported equally by prosecutors and defense lawyers”148 and designed to 
cover only a narrow range of cases.149  Thus, “[a] representative of the 
Colorado Attorney General’s office testified that the legislation was 
‘narrowly defined’ and that it would not apply to defendants who ‘are just 
acquitted after trial’ or those ‘who have their convictions reversed after 
appeal based on a procedural or a legal error.’”150  The Colorado State 
General Assembly thus estimated that “compensation . . . would be awarded 
to only one defendant every five years.”151  The bill passed the Colorado 
House by a 60-to-2 vote and passed the Senate unanimously, all of which 
Nelson documented in her brief.152  In its own brief, Colorado did not 
challenge any of these assertions.153 
In addition to ignoring the legislative history, the Colorado court’s reading 
of the Exoneration Act is hard to square with the terms of the Act, which 
provide that only certain individuals convicted of a crime may pursue 
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relief.154  The statute applies only to “a person who has been convicted of a 
felony . . . and sentenced to a term of incarceration . . . and has served all or 
part of such sentence.”155  These limits jibe with the legislative history but 
make no sense under the Colorado court’s broader reading of the statute.  If 
the statute were the sole authorization for refunds, why would payments be 
available only to persons convicted of felonies and not misdemeanors, only 
to persons sentenced to incarceration, and only to persons who have served 
part of the sentence of incarceration? 
Having demolished the Colorado Supreme Court’s rationale, the 
petitioners might have gone on to invoke the principle of Anderson.  They 
could have argued, in the most powerful way, that the Colorado court’s ruling 
against them rested on an inadequate state ground because its Exoneration 
Act rationale did not have fair support in state law.  They evidently preferred 
to treat the Colorado Supreme Court’s construction of the Exoneration Act 
as the final word on state law and to instead advance a due process 
argument.156  Since they won anyway, it may seem churlish to criticize that 
choice.  And it may be unfair to fault the Supreme Court for failing to opt for 
a rationale that was never briefed or argued. 
Still, there were good reasons for the Court to take the “antecedent state 
ground” approach to Nelson.  One of its main advantages is that it avoids any 
need for the Court to rely (even if implicitly) on a controversial “natural 
property” line of analysis.157  A recognition that pre-Exoneration Act 
principles continued to govern Nelson’s case would have permitted the Court 
to rely squarely on the Roth state-created-property line of cases.  After all, 
even Colorado’s lawyers relied solely on the Exoneration Act in their brief 
to the Court, a strategy that seems to implicitly concede that Nelson had a 
right to secure a refund under state law so long as pre-Exoneration Act law 
was operative.158  By avoiding the Court’s ad hoc definition of Fourteenth 
Amendment “property,” the antecedent state ground route would contribute 
to coherence in constitutional law. 
In addition, the “antecedent state ground” approach is more flexible than 
the Court’s method.  I suggested earlier that the majority’s rationale may not 
admit the equitable exception illustrated by Noel.159  State-created property 
has no difficulty accounting for such exceptions.  For example, government 
jobs and other benefits are typically subject to conditions, notably that an 
employee can be fired “for cause” or that a business license may be forfeited 
for violation of safety regulations.160  Finally, as Part III discusses, the state-
created-property approach puts the property interest on a footing that is 
analytically distinct from the “liberty” protected by the Due Process 
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Clause.161  Thus, a state-created-property approach does not depend on the 
Court’s unconvincing distinction between “property” and “liberty.”162 
A downside of the “antecedent state ground” approach, at least from a 
property protection point of view, is that it permits a state to do away with 
restoration if that is its preference.  In particular, a state legislature could 
enact a statute exactly like the Exoneration Act, with an express declaration 
in the act itself that it provided the sole basis for postexoneration recovery.  
A state court opinion that implemented such a statute would (to say the least) 
not lack “fair support” in state law.  And many observers would find this 
result troubling precisely because it seems not at all “natural” for the state to 
keep money it acquired from persons it has invalidly convicted.163 
One answer to this objection is that democratic values should count for 
something in the definition of “property” for purposes of Fourteenth 
Amendment protection.  Given the generally light constitutional scrutiny of 
property regulation,164 it seems appropriate to recognize that a 
democratically elected legislature may decide to reject refunds.  In any case, 
the objection is mainly theoretical.  In practice, democratic values seem to 
favor the right to refund, as it enjoys wide support throughout the nation.165  
It is hard to find critics of the Supreme Court’s holding in Nelson.  Colorado’s 
experience is instructive.  Indeed, after the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nelson, the Colorado legislature enacted a statute that generally 
authorized restoration.166 
Colorado’s enactment of this statute supports the view that the Colorado 
court misread the Exoneration Act.  In addition, the new statute may help to 
explain Justice Ginsburg’s cavalier treatment of Fourteenth Amendment 
property doctrine.167  Since other jurisdictions already allow refunds,168 and 
since Colorado will do so in the future under the new statute,169 the holding 
will have little impact on the basic issue of whether refunds are available.  
The Court may have viewed Nelson as an occasion for doing nothing more 
than correcting an injustice in the case at hand.170  But its “natural” property 
rationale now lies ready for use—and the creation of still more confusion—
in future litigation. 
III.  PROPERTY AND LIBERTY 
Nelson was an unusual case because states generally refund most payments 
made pursuant to nullified convictions.171  But the Due Process Clause 
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protects liberty as well as property.172  Besides imposing fines and other 
charges, states typically lock people up upon conviction and do not 
compensate them for their loss of liberty if and when their convictions are 
dislodged.173  In Nelson, the Court held that in the property context, “[t]o 
comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more than 
minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction 
subsequently invalidated.”174  How does this reasoning apply to liberty? 
The very core of Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” is “freedom from 
personal restraint.”175  And, broadly speaking, modern Supreme Court 
doctrine systematically accords far greater constitutional protection to liberty 
in this essential form than to interests in property.176  The question thus arises, 
If due process requires nothing more than “minimal procedures” to vindicate 
through monetary recovery the deprivation of one’s property, why should it 
require anything more to vindicate, through a monetary recovery, the 
deprivation of one’s liberty?  To be sure, recognition of such an obligation 
would potentially impose far greater costs on state governments than the 
property holding in Nelson.  And the current Supreme Court surely will not 
extend Nelson to cover liberty.  In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the 
Court gives no reason to think that even a more liberal Court would do so.  
But as a matter of constitutional principle and doctrine, why should it not? 
This Part begins with a discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to 
distinguish between property and liberty in her majority opinion in Nelson.  
It next discusses the alternative, historical-perspective approach advocated 
for by Justice Alito in concurrence and considers whether relying on history 
and tradition was the better approach to addressing the plaintiff’s claim in 
Nelson. 
A.  Distinguishing Liberty and Property in Nelson 
The three opinions in Nelson give three different reasons for not requiring 
states to compensate for lost liberty.  In his dissent, Justice Thomas declined 
to distinguish between liberty and property.177  His view was that Nelson and 
Madden had no constitutional right to recover anything.178  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Alito cited the general principle that “historical practice is 
probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as 
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fundamental.”179  Building on this principle, he emphasized that, as a matter 
of historical practice, states routinely refund money while not compensating 
for lost liberty, except in exceptional circumstances.180  Thus, “history and 
tradition” operated to support a distinction between property and liberty in 
this setting.181 
The majority took a different tack.  Colorado had argued that “if the 
Exoneration Act provides sufficient process to compensate a defendant for 
the loss of her liberty, the Act should also suffice [for loss of her 
property].”182  But Justice Ginsburg rejected the property/liberty link on the 
ground that an act of restoration by the state differs fundamentally from an 
act of compensation by the state.183  As she explained: 
The comparison [suggested by Colorado] is inapt.  Nelson and Madden 
seek restoration of funds they paid to the State, not compensation for 
temporary deprivation of those funds.  Petitioners seek only their money 
back, not interest on those funds for the period the funds were in the State’s 
custody.  Just as the restoration of liberty on reversal of a conviction is not 
compensation, neither is the return of money taken by the State on account 
of the conviction.184 
Under scrutiny, this property/liberty distinction seems to dissolve.  
Restoration of funds is the functional equivalent of compensation.  That 
restoration, after all, is what makes the plaintiff whole.185  The Court stressed 
that Nelson and Madden did not seek interest on the money, which means 
that they were not made completely whole.186  But the interest was a minor 
matter—the tiny tail of the dog when it came to compensating these 
defendants for their losses. 
The final sentence of Ginsburg’s passage quoted above both falsely 
equates the restoration of liberty with the restoration of property and confuses 
two senses of the term “restoration.”187  As to the first point, money can be 
reduced to a physical object so that an order requiring the state to return 
money will make the plaintiff almost whole.  Liberty, by contrast, is an 
experience.  When someone is confined, their experience of liberty is lost 
forever.  One might attempt to distinguish liberty and property on the ground 
that the state is enriched when it deprives a person of property but not when 
it deprives a person of liberty.  But that distinction fails in this context 
because the Due Process Clause focuses on what happens to the “person” 
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who is “deprive[d],” not what happens to the state.188  One might even 
imagine a world in which money paid to the state as fines or fees pursuant to 
conviction is immediately destroyed by the state.  In such a case, the state is 
not enriched.  Even so, for Due Process Clause purposes there is still a 
deprivation of “property”—just as surely as there is a deprivation of liberty 
when a defendant is placed behind bars. 
As to the second point, the Court’s “just as” comparison lumps together 
two distinct senses in which “restoration” can occur.  Restoration of liberty 
signifies only that liberty is no longer being taken—not that one is getting 
back the lost liberty.  The Court correctly points out that “restoration of 
liberty on reversal of a conviction is not compensation.”189  But the Court is 
mistaken when it asserts that “the return of money” is not compensation.190  
In every functional sense it is, and that is true regardless of academic 
hairsplitting about the distinction between the “return” of the money, on the 
one hand, and “compensation” through the payment of interest, on the other.  
It is beside the point that no interest was paid.  The essential purpose of 
making a payment equivalent to the amount of fees and fines is to compensate 
the plaintiff for the (now found to be erroneous) extraction of those amounts 
from the plaintiff. 
B.  An Appeal to History and Tradition:  Nelson Reconsidered 
In light of all of this, the Court would have done far better to rely on history 
and tradition, as Justice Alito suggested.191  This suggestion may seem 
wrongheaded, and its shortcomings must be acknowledged.  In many 
situations, a strictly historical rationale for a rule is vulnerable to the 
objection that it favors the status quo, even when there are compelling 
reasons for change.  And there surely are good reasons of constitutional 
principle for requiring governments to compensate defendants for 
confinement when their convictions are overturned.  In these cases, the state 
has deprived a person of constitutionally protected liberty for a reason now 
shown to be unsound.  If an appellate reversal provides a sufficiently strong 
ground to oblige states to pay for property deprivations, as Nelson holds, then 
a strong a fortiori argument for requiring similar payments for liberty 
deprivations surely exists. 
Justice Ginsburg’s “natural property” approach unwittingly adds force to 
the case for compensation.  As discussed, she seems to treat the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the source of property rights, just as the Court has 
traditionally done with liberty.192  Her analysis thus seems to place the two 
rights on the same footing.  And if property and liberty have the same Due 
Process Clause source, it becomes more difficult to see why they should not 
enjoy the same Due Process Clause protection.  Nelson holds that property 
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loss triggers the right to a remedy pursuant to “minimal procedures.”193  Why 
should liberty not get the same protection?  If the Due Process Clause creates 
a property right for Nelson to be restored to the status quo ante when her 
conviction is overturned, it seems sensible to say that the Due Process Clause 
likewise creates a liberty right to be restored to the status quo ante. 
The “history and tradition” rationale fares much better if liberty and 
property are kept separate, as they are under Roth,194 a case in which the 
Court drew a sharp distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment content 
of property and of liberty.195  Property interests are created by state or federal 
statutory and common law and practice.196  But Roth “outlined distinctively 
different methodologies for identifying constitutional liberty and 
property.”197  In describing the source and scope of Fourteenth Amendment 
“liberty,” the Court did not turn to state law.  Instead, it cited Meyer v. 
Nebraska,198 a substantive due process decision.199  According to Meyer, 
liberty 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, 
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry . . . and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.200 
The Court’s post-Meyer body of case law on “liberty” treats the Due Process 
Clause as the source of these rights.201 
Under the Roth approach, “history and tradition” are not just boilerplate 
arguments for the status quo.202  They provide viable doctrinal grounds for 
continued adherence to the rule that the Due Process Clause does not entitle 
defendants to compensation for confinement pending appeal.203  The 
criminal procedure may provide sufficient process to justify the deprivation 
of liberty, so long as that process is not tainted by the constitutional or 
common law tort of malicious prosecution.204  By contrast, under Roth, the 
content of Nelson and Madden’s property right is defined differently.205  It 
depends on legitimate expectations formed by reliance on state or federal 
statutory law, common law, and the policies and practices of institutions.206  
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The general practice, including pre-Exoneration Act practice in Colorado, 
was to refund much of the money exacted from the defendant upon 
conviction.207  Based on this practice, Nelson and Madden can claim a state-
created property right to a refund.  As for the impact of the Exoneration Act, 
the Colorado court’s reading of it lacks fair support in Colorado law.208  The 
Supreme Court should have ruled that it is not an adequate state law ground 
for the holding against Nelson and Madden. 
The tradition of distinguishing between liberty and property in the 
“restoration” context probably reflects a pragmatic judgment that the cost of 
compensation for lost liberty would be much higher than paying for fees and 
fines.  If that judgment clashes with the maxim that a remedy should be 
available for every violation of a constitutional right,209  the maxim must give 
way in the face of reality.  As Daryl Levinson has shown, “the actual practice 
of constitutional law” is that “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for 
their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very 
existence.”210  Building on the work of Levinson and others, Richard Fallon 
has developed the “Equilibration Thesis,” which “holds that courts, and 
especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as 
an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, 
substantive rights, and available remedies.”211  None of this settles the issue 
of whether persons in Nelson’s place should have a remedy for their lost 
liberty.  But the Equilibration Thesis does suggest that if a remedy is too 
costly it will not be made available.212  Thus, a distinction between property 
and liberty claims is broadly consistent with the general principles governing 
the relations between rights and remedies in our system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s analysis is limited to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nelson.  
It is not a comprehensive treatment of issues raised by “liberty” and 
“property” claims in other contexts, including “restoration” cases.  It also 
fails to examine two other avenues of relief that may have been available to 
the plaintiff in Nelson.  First, Nelson’s procedural due process reasoning does 
not apply to a claim that a statute like the Exoneration Act—one enacted with 
the avowed aim of denying restoration—would violate substantive due 
process.  In that context, constitutional property may be defined 
differently,213 and Roth would not control.  The Court may define property 
without regard to the entitlements created by state law, strike down the 
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hypothesized statute as an arbitrary exercise of the state’s legislative power, 
and distinguish “liberty” on grounds of history and tradition. 
Second, and relatedly, Colorado’s refusal to return the money may amount 
to a “taking,” such that the state would be obliged to return it under the 
Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence.214  The important point here is that 
the Court’s ruling in Nelson itself raised far more questions than it answered.  
In later cases, more than the Court seemed to realize, it will have no choice 
but to deal with the complex problems lurking beneath the surface of the 
Nelson opinion. 
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